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Non-technical summary:
This paper investigates the economic impacts of two policy proposals: "Strom ohne Atom"
(SOA) and "Moratorium Plus" (MOP), both of which contain a premature phase-out of
nuclear power in Switzerland. While MOP restricts business-as-usual operation time of
existing nuclear power plants to 40 years, which results in a cutback of 10-20 years, SOA
foresees a reduction in operation time of 20-30 years and administers combined heat and
power to substitute for nuclear energy. Based on simulations with an intertemporal multi-
sector general equilibrium model of the Swiss economy, we find that SOA, particularly,
imposes non-negligible adjustment costs to the Swiss economy. The reason is that SOA – as
compared to MOP –is not only more restrictive with respect to the permissible operation time
of existing nuclear power plants; it also administers the use of non-competitive CHP during
the transition phase to back up nuclear capacities. Costs of accelerating the phase-out of
nuclear power for an average household amount to 200 CHF/a over the next 45 years under
SOA and drop to 60 CHF/a in the case of MOP. Under climate policy considerations, both
phase-out scenarios induce substantially higher carbon emissions during the adjustment path,
since larger BAU supplies of carbon-free nuclear power must be replaced by fossil fuel
technologies. If Switzerland were to keep carbon emissions at BAU levels larger CO2 taxes
would have to be levied, which would magnify the costs of a premature phase-out. In the case
of carbon-neutrality, adjustment costs increase to 230 CHF under SOA (i.e. SOA-N) and 110
CHF under MOP (i.e. MOP-N). In our calculations we do not account for the external costs of
nuclear power due to the large uncertainties in the valuation of nuclear risks. Therefore, the
adjustment costs presented in our analysis can not be interpreted as simple excess costs of
energy policy interference, but must be viewed as the price tag for the risk reduction from
nuclear power operation given additional constraints (preferences) on back-up technologies
and carbon neutrality.
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Abstract
This paper investigates the economic impacts of two policy proposals: "Strom ohne Atom" (SOA) and
"Moratorium Plus" (MOP), both of which contain a premature phase-out of nuclear power in
Switzerland. While MOP restricts business-as-usual operation time of existing nuclear power plants to
40 years, which results in a cutback of 10-20 years, SOA foresees a reduction in operation time of 20-
30 years and administers combined heat and power to substitute for nuclear energy. Based on
simulations with an intertemporal multi-sector general equilibrium model of the Swiss economy, we
quantify the price tags for risk reduction from nuclear power operation given additional constraints on
back-up technologies. Costs of accelerating the phase-out of nuclear power for an average household
amount to 200 CHF/a over the next 45 years under SOA and drop to 60 CHF/a in the case of MOP. If
Switzerland were to assure carbon neutrality of a premature phase-out by the use of carbon taxes,
adjustment costs would increase to 230 CHF under SOA and 110 CHF under MOP.
Keywords: nuclear phase-out, computable general equilibrium
JEL-classification: Q48, C68
21. Introduction
In 2002, the Swiss voters will have to decide on two proposals for a premature phase-out of
nuclear power in Switzerland, which currently accounts for 40% of the Swiss electricity production.
Both proposals foresee a reduction of the operating time of existing nuclear power plants as compared
to business-as-usual (BAU). Under BAU the power plants are scheduled to be in operation for 50 up to
60 calendar years. The proposal "Strom ohne Atom" (SOA) postulates a maximum operating time of
30 year, whereas the proposal "Moratorium Plus" (MOP) restricts the operating time to 40 years. SOA
is not only more restrictive with respect to the permissible operating time but also entails the massive
promotion of non-competitive combined heat and power to substitute for nuclear power.
In this paper, we investigate the economic implications induced by the premature phase-out
scenarios of nuclear power under SOA and MOP. The main insights from our analysis can be
summarized as follows:
• SOA induces non-negligible adjustment costs for the Swiss economy with an annual loss of
200 CHF per year and household over the next 45 years. This amount may be interpreted as a
required average willingness-to-pay for having the SOA proposal implemented.
• The negative repercussions of SOA get substantially attenuated in the MOP scenario. Not only
the use of existing nuclear power capacities for additional ten years but also the unrestricted
choice of non-nuclear replacement technologies cut down aggregate adjustment costs vis-à-vis
SOA. Instead of the administered use of combined heat and power under SOA, cheaper
combined cycle gas turbines will back up nuclear power in the MOP scenario. At the
household level, average costs drop to 60 CHF/a.
• The premature phase-out of nuclear power increases Swiss CO2 emissions, since fossil fuel
power generation will be used more extensively than under BAU. To assure carbon neutrality
with respect to BAU emission levels, carbon taxes of up to 45 CHF per ton of CO2 must be
imposed under SOA and MOP. The tax-induced distortions magnify the phase-out costs.
Annual losses per household over the next 45 years increase to 230 CHF for the case of SOA
and 110 CHF for the case of MOP.
• Economy-wide employment losses of premature nuclear phase-out are negligible, since
substitution effects in factor demand of sectoral production compensate negative output
effects. Even for the case of carbon neutrality, where carbon taxes reduce labor productivity,
recycling of tax revenues through cuts in labor costs nearly offset negative impacts on labor
demand.
Our results are based on simulations with an intertemporal computable general equilibrium
(CGE) model for the Swiss economy. An important feature of this model is the incorporation of a
bottom-up engineering-type representation of the electricity sector within an aggregate top-down
description of the rest of the economy. This hybrid approach (see Böhringer 1996 and 1998 for the
3general methodology) accounts for discrete technological responses in the power sector that will be
triggered by energy policy interference.
There are two previous studies which investigated the potential economic effects of SOA and
MOP (Prognos 2000; Pfaffenberger and Gerdey 2001). Both studies are based on bottom-up partial
equilibrium models for the Swiss electricity sector. Hence, these studies only capture the direct effects
of energy policy interference on the electricity sector and do not report indirect effects on indicators of
the remaining economy. In addition, they do not account for forward-looking behavior of economic
agents which may substantially flaw economic rationality of investment decisions in the context of
long-term policy issues. A comparison of cost estimates reveals that the bottom-up studies might
significantly underestimate the economy-wide costs of a premature phase-out since negative feed-back
and spillover effects to other markets are neglected.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a non-technical summary of the
model and its parameterization. Section 3 lays out the policy scenarios and the simulation results.
Section 4 concludes.
2. Analytical Framework
Our model combines several features that are required for an appropriate quantitative simulation
of the effects induced by exogenous energy policy measures:
• At the sectoral level, it incorporates sufficient detail on sector-specific differences in factor
intensities, degrees of input substitutability and price elasticites of demand in order to trace
back the structural change in production and consumption patterns induced by a policy shift.
• The Swiss tax system is represented in sufficient detail to capture initial tax distortions.
• Consumption and investment decisions are based on rational expectations of future prices
(clairvoyance). This assures that the effects of policy interference on savings and investments
are consistently taken into account.
• Capital is internationally mobile with the rates of return determined by an exogenous
international interest rate.
• The production possibilities in the electricity sector are represented by the convex
combinations of discrete technological options instead of top-down smooth constant-elasticity-
of substitution (CES) production functions usually employed within the CGE approach. The
bottom-up description of technologies for the electricity sector, which is based on engineering
data, provides a realistic picture of endogenous adjustment to policy measures that are,
particularly, targeted to the electricity sector (as is the case for nuclear phase-out policies).
The following section provides a non-technical description of an intertemporal multi-sector
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model designed for the analysis of energy policy interference
4in open economies. The detailed algebraic model formulation can be downloaded from
www.ecoplan.ch/download/swiss_phase_out_app.pdf.
2.1. Basic Model Structure
The model contains a disaggregate representation of 38 industries, whereby the electricity sector
is modeled in technological detail. To account for different pollutant and energy intensities as well as
inter-fuel substitution possibilities across energy goods, the model identifies 6 energy goods: heavy
oil, light oil, gasoline, diesel, gas and electricity. Furthermore, the model incorporates major
electricity-intensive industries such as the textile industry or manufacturing of paper which are most
susceptible to the effects of changes in electricity prices. Producer goods are directly demanded by
government, investment and export. Producer goods for consumption are demanded only indirectly
because the model distinguishes 13 aggregate consumption categories which are produced by
combining the outputs of the 38 industries in fixed proportions. Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix
summarize the classification of industry and consumer commodities.
Production
Competitive entrepreneurs minimize the cost of production and allocate investment across sectors
in order to maximize the present value of firms. For each industry except for the electricity sector, an
aggregate production function characterizes technology through transformation possibilities on the
output side (between production for domestic and export markets) and substitution possibilities on the
input side (between alternative combinations of inputs). On the output side, production is split between
goods produced for the domestic market and goods produced for the export market subject to a
constant elasticity of transformation. On the input side, nested separable CES functions describe the
technological substitution possibilities in domestic production between capital, labor, energy and
material inputs (including diesel and gasoline). At the top level, material inputs are used in fixed
proportions, together with a CES aggregate of labor and an energy-capital composite. Within the latter
energy-capital composite, energy and capital trade off at a constant elasticity of substitution. The
energy aggregate, in turn, is produced with a CES technology using oil (heavy and light oil), gas and
electricity as inputs.
Household Behavior
Consumers choose to allocate lifetime income across consumption in different time periods. In
each period, the consumer faces the choice between current consumption (non-leisure consumption
goods and leisure) and savings (future consumption). The pure rate of time preference determines the
intertemporal allocation of consumption. We employ a separable intertemporal utility function where
the intra-period utility from consumption is based on a nested CES function over leisure and non-
leisure consumption commodities. Utility from different periods trade off at a constant intertemporal
elasticity of substitution.
5Factors
Primary factors of production are labor and capital. Labor supply is elastic. Capital and labor are
inter-sectorally mobile in the home country, but only capital can move across domestic borders. Total
labor endowment increases with labor force efficiency along a steady-state growth rate. Capital stocks
evolve through geometric depreciation and new investment. In the small open economy framework,
the rates of return on mobile capital are determined by the international interest rate. We assume
perfectly competitive factor markets in which factor prices adjust so that supply equals demand.
Government Sector
The government distributes transfers and provides a public good (including public investment),
which is produced with commodities purchased at market prices. Government expenditures are
financed with tax revenues. The model incorporates the main features of the Swiss tax and social
transfer system. The public budget is balanced on an intertemporal basis. Along the baseline growth
path, public income and expenditures balance on a period-by-period basis. In the policy
counterfactuals, the application of environmental taxes might result in a temporary public deficit, as
the anticipation of future tax revenue permits public expenditure to exceed government income during
the initial periods. In all simulations the present value of public expenditure equals the present value
of tax revenues.
Investment and Savings
The level of savings is endogenously determined by households which maximize lifetime
consumption over the time horizon. Firm owners choose investment in order to maximize the present
value of the firm. Investors and households compete for current consumption such that in equilibrium
the marginal utilities of savings (future consumption) and demand (current consumption) are
equalized.
Foreign Trade
Following the proposition of Armington (1969), domestic and foreign goods are distinguished by
origin. This accommodates both imports and exports of the same commodity to reflect empirical
evidence on the crosshauling of trade flows. Due to lack of more detailed data, domestic and imported
varieties of the same good are aggregated with identical shares across all components of final and
intermediate demand. Demand for imports stems from cost-minimizing producer behavior and utility
maximization of households. On the export side, products destined for domestic and international
markets are treated as imperfect substitutes, which trade off at a constant rate of substitution.
Switzerland is treated as small in relation to the world market. The small country assumption implies
that changes in the level of Swiss exports and imports have no effect on its terms of trade -
international prices are exogenously fixed in foreign currency, i.e. export demand and import supply
functions are horizontal. International capital flows (borrowing and lending) are endogenous, subject
to an intertemporal balance of payments constraint, i.e. there is no change in net indebtedness over the
6model horizon. The imposition of an intertemporally balanced trade account is linked to a variable
exchange rate which reconciles the present value of domestic import and foreign export demands.
2.2. Parameterization of the Basic Model
As is customary in applied general equilibrium analysis, the model is based on economic
transactions in a benchmark year, 1998 in our case. Benchmark data determines parameters of the
functional forms from a given set of benchmark quantities, prices, and elasticities. We replace the
aggregate input-output monetary values for energy supply and demand with physical energy flows
supplemented by official energy prices for industry and households (for details, see Prognos 1996).
Data on various tax payments and transfers are taken from the Swiss Statistical Yearbook 1998.
Consistency of the intertemporal model with steady-state growth implies an endogenous relationship
between three parameters: the rate of time preference, the depreciation rate of capital, and the growth
rate of labor in efficiency units. In our simulations, we assume an exogenous labor growth rate of
1.3% and a time preference rate (interest rate) of 2%, which yields a capital depreciation rate of 4%.
Tables A3 and A4 in the appendix summarize key elasticities.
2.3. Bottom-up Representation of Electricity Sector
Overview of Electricity Sector Sub-Module
The standard description of power generation options via nested CES functions is replaced with a
discrete representation of technologies (Böhringer 1998). Power producers have discrete choices with
respect to alternative technologies and combine these base on capacity constraints in order to meet
electricity demand in a cost-minimizing way. Swiss power generation in the base year is represented
through eight technologies which cover the five nuclear power plants KKB I (Beznau I), KKB II
(Beznau II), KKM (Mühleberg), KKG (Gösgen) and KKL (Leibstad), a representative hydro power
technology, a representative combined heat and power (CHP) technology, and a conventional oil-fired
power plant technology.
Table 1 provides a summary of base-year technologies, incorporated in the electricity sub-module
of our model, with the respective shares in total Swiss electricity production.
Table 1: Overview of base-year power generation technologies
Nuclear power plants
KKB I KKB II KKM KKG KKL
Hydroelectric
power plants CHP
Oil fired
power plants Total
2736 2676 2682 7640 8527
GWh
24261
33200 1622 1098 60181
4.6% 4.5% 4.5% 12.7% 14.2%
Share
40.5%
55.17% 2.70% 1.82% 100%
As to replacement technologies, there are three different combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT)
technologies, one district heating technology (DH) and eight different CHP technologies that differ
with respect to cost structure and potential production capacities.
7Electricity is routed to consumers via three different types of grids: supraregional, regional, and
local grids. The respective end customers face different distribution prices. As to regional and
supraregional grids, a further price distinction is made between major customers and average
customers. The total price for electricity is composed of uniform electricity generation prices and
consumer-specific distribution prices. Furthermore, the model distinguishes between winter load and
summer load. Each power generation technology is characterized by an annual load pattern. Figure 1
sketches the structure of the electricity sector as incorporated into the general equilibrium model.
Figure 1: Modeling of electricity sector
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Parameterization
For the economic analysis of premature nuclear phase-out policies, the marginal costs of existing
power plants as well as the full cost of backup technologies are crucial. Tables 2 and 3 provide the
main economic indicators for existing Swiss power plants as well as future replacement options (for
details see Ecoplan 2001 pp. 125). Backup technologies include three different combined cycle gas
turbines (CCGT), district heating (DH), and eight combined heat and power technologies (CHP).
Technologies not only differ with respect to cost structure but also with respect to capacity bounds.
8Table 2: Economic indicators of existing power plants technologies
Nuclear power plants
KKB I KKB II KKM KKG KKL
Production potential (GWh/a) 2736 2676 2682 7639 8527
Winter share (%) 56.8 56.8 56.8 56.8 56.8
Operation costs (Cts./kWh)
Maintenance and labor costs 2.52 1.71 1.69
Disposal costs 0.26 0.26 0.26
Fuel costs 0.65 0.59 0.5
Total (Cts./kWh) 3.43 2.57 2.46
Costs for extending operating time +10 years 0.74 0.71 0.75
Total – extended lifetime (Cts./kWh) 4.17 3.28 3.20
Existing non-nuclear power plants
Hydroelectric
power plants
Existing CHP
plants
Oil fired power
plants
Production potential (GWh/a) 33200 1622 1098
Winter share (%) 44.8 64.6 53.2
Operation costs (Cts./kWh)
Maintenance and labor costs 3.40 1.24 1.25
Fuel costs 6.05 3.75
./. Heat credit 2.81
Capital costs 2.77 1.88 1.25
Total (Cts./kWh) 6.17 6.36 6.25
Table 3: Economic indicators of backup technology options
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CCGT1 0.79 4.91 0.00 0.61 6.30 1206 57
CCGT2 0.99 4.91 0.00 0.76 6.65 135 71
CCGT3 1.39 4.91 0.00 1.07 7.36 100
DH 1.72 5.52 2.57 1.14 5.81 1206 75
CHP1 1.58 9.16 4.84 1.21 7.12 135 55
CHP2 1.82 7.07 3.87 2.31 7.33 855 75
CHP3 1.95 7.56 4.19 2.48 7.80 866 75
CHP4 1.59 10.32 5.27 1.27 7.91 350 55
CHP5 2.59 8.51 4.94 2.67 8.83 940 74
CHP6 3.42 9.88 5.93 2.78 10.15 1339 75
CHP7 3.57 11.81 7.30 3.13 11.22 971 80
CHP8 4.11 12.67 7.88 3.33 12.23 >1000 80
94. Scenarios and Results
4.1 Scenarios
The economic impacts of a premature phase-out under SOA and MOP are measured with respect
to the business-as-usual scenario BAU where existing nuclear power plants remain in operation for 50
years (KKB I and II, KKM) and 60 years respectively (KKG and KKL). Moreover, under BAU as
under MOP no restriction is imposed on the use of power generation from fossil fuels. The scenario
MOP reduces operating time of nuclear power plants to 40 calendar years. The scenario SOA
postulates an operating time of only 30 years and, in addition, includes the promotion of non-
competitive combined heat-and-power technologies.
Table 4 summarizes the final operating years of Swiss nuclear power plants under BAU, MOP
and SOA.
Table 4: Final operating years of Swiss nuclear power plants
KKB I KKB II KKM KKG KKL
BAU 2019 2021 2022 2039 2044
SOA 2004 2004 2004 2009 2014
MOP 2009 2011 2012 2019 2024
One concern of the protagonists for the premature phase-out of nuclear power is that discarded
domestic nuclear power will be replaced by additional electricity imports from abroad (which may
stem to a larger extent from foreign nuclear power production). In this vein, the simulations of SOA
and MOP assume "trade-neutrality" with respect to BAU. In concrete terms, we impose the BAU
imports as an upper bound on the permissible inflows of electricity from abroad (see Table 5). The
international electricity prices applying to long-term import and export obligations are set to 5.5
Cts./kWh, which reflects long-term marginal production costs in Europe for base load.
Table 5: Upper bounds on electricity imports
Total per year Summer Winter
Until 2004 15588 7293 8295
2005 till 2009 14828 6968 7860
2010 till 2019 14040 6574 7466
From 2020 onwards 13900 6255 7645
In addition to these import restrictions, SOA postulates that replacement capacities for nuclear
power must be based on CHP. In our simulations we adopt the recommendations of the energy policy
advisory board to the Swiss Federal Office of Energy (see Prognos 1999) to subsidize non-competitive
CHP to a level that prevents investment in CCGT technologies during the transition period until 2045.
The associated subsidies are covered by a sales tax on nuclear power, hydropower and imported
electricity.
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Without further regulation, the premature nuclear phase-out will increase Swiss carbon emissions
over the next decades since carbon-free nuclear power will be replaced by electricity from either CHP
or CCGT, both requiring fossil fuel inputs. Given the importance of anthropogenic carbon emissions
in the context of national and international greenhouse gas abatement policies, we have defined two
additional scenarios SOA-N and MOP-N, which assures CO2-neutrality as compared to BAU. In other
words, the scenarios SOA-N and MOP-N are supplemented with an economy-wide carbon constraint
such that CO2 emissions do not exceed the BAU emission levels. When the carbon constraint becomes
binding, the associated shadow price indicates the level of the carbon tax that must be levied to
warrant CO2-neutrality. Revenues from carbon taxes are recycled in proportion to tax payments
through per-capita transfers to households and through a reduction in payroll taxes of employees.
Table 6 provides a short characterization of all scenarios simulated in the following section.
Table 6: Summary of scenarios
Scenario Operating time of nuclearpower plants CO2 neutrality
Fossil power generation without
waste heat utilization
BAU 50/60 -- yes
SOA 30 no no
MOP 40 no yes
SOA-N 30 yes no
MOP-N 40 yes yes
4.2 Results
Macroeconomic Impacts
Table 7 to Table 10 summarize the changes in key macroeconomic indicators across scenarios
SOA, SOA-N, MOP, and MOP-N as compared to BAU.
Table 7: Macroeconomic impacts of SOA (in % change versus BAU)
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 long run
GDP -0.15% -0.32% -0.56% -0.57% -0.55% -0.54% -0.53% -0.27%
Domestic production -0.09% -0.20% -0.32% -0.34% -0.33% -0.33% -0.34% -0.21%
Labor input -0.03% -0.12% -0.15% -0.16% -0.14% -0.13% -0.13% -0.07%
Capital input -0.05% -0.14% -0.24% -0.35% -0.42% -0.45% -0.47% -0.34%
Consumption -0.06% -0.15% -0.28% -0.33% -0.35% -0.36% -0.37% -0.15%
Investments -0.87% -1.23% -1.65% -1.48% -1.29% -1.22% -1.18% -0.68%
Energy use 0.18% 0.42% 2.86% 3.19% 3.52% 3.89% 3.77% -0.25%
Electricity 0.25% -4.33% -8.65% -8.55% -8.02% -7.48% -7.10% -0.24%
Fossil energy 0.16% 2.27% 7.44% 7.99% 8.29% 8.61% 8.14% -0.25%
Real wage -0.10% -0.21% -0.32% -0.34% -0.33% -0.33% -0.34% -0.17%
Real capital rate -0.11% -0.22% -0.33% -0.36% -0.34% -0.34% -0.35% -0.19%
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Table 8: Macroeconomic impacts of MOP (in % change versus BAU)
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 long run
GDP 0.05% 0.06% 0.05% -0.01% -0.06% -0.07% -0.08% -0.01%
Domestic production 0.03% 0.04% 0.02% 0.02% 0.04% 0.01% 0.00% -0.03%
Labor input 0.02% 0.02% 0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.02% -0.02% -0.03%
Capital input 0.01% 0.03% 0.04% 0.03% 0.02% -0.01% -0.04% -0.08%
Consumption -0.04% -0.05% -0.05% -0.07% -0.09% -0.09% -0.08% -0.02%
Investment 0.29% 0.27% 0.17% 0.04% -0.04% -0.07% -0.17% 0.04%
Energy use -0.01% 0.07% 0.28% 3.83% 8.63% 7.58% 7.92% -0.05%
Electricity -0.01% 0.15% 0.60% -0.98% -1.36% -1.28% -0.23% -0.05%
Fossil energy -0.01% 0.03% 0.15% 5.79% 12.76% 11.26% 11.19% -0.05%
Real wage 0.02% 0.02% 0.01% -0.02% -0.02% -0.03% -0.04% 0.00%
Real capital rate 0.01% 0.00% -0.01% -0.04% -0.04% -0.05% -0.06% -0.02%
Table 9: Macroeconomic impacts of SOA-N (in % change versus BAU)
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 long run
GDP -0.27% -0.46% -0.71% -0.73% -0.71% -0.69% -0.67% -0.38%
Domestic production -0.15% -0.34% -0.59% -0.62% -0.60% -0.58% -0.56% -0.25%
Labor input -0.05% -0.17% -0.20% -0.20% -0.18% -0.17% -0.14% -0.06%
Capital input -0.07% -0.21% -0.35% -0.48% -0.54% -0.57% -0.57% -0.37%
Consumption -0.03% -0.15% -0.30% -0.37% -0.40% -0.43% -0.44% -0.17%
Investment -1.49% -1.93% -2.37% -2.19% -1.96% -1.80% -1.66% -1.06%
Energy use 0.19% -1.10% -1.09% -1.32% -1.27% -0.97% -0.58% -0.27%
Electricity 0.25% -4.90% -8.66% -9.10% -9.10% -8.81% -7.95% -0.26%
Fossil energy 0.17% 0.39% 1.93% 1.86% 1.97% 2.29% 2.38% -0.27%
Real wage -0.13% -0.27% -0.34% -0.38% -0.38% -0.39% -0.38% -0.23%
Real capital rate -0.12% -0.26% -0.33% -0.37% -0.38% -0.38% -0.37% -0.23%
Table 10: Macroeconomic impacts of MOP-N (in % change versus BAU)
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 long run
GDP -0.04% -0.06% -0.10% -0.19% -0.27% -0.27% -0.26% -0.12%
Domestic production -0.02% -0.04% -0.09% -0.23% -0.36% -0.35% -0.33% -0.10%
Labor input -0.01% -0.02% -0.05% -0.12% -0.14% -0.13% -0.10% -0.04%
Capital input -0.01% -0.03% -0.07% -0.14% -0.20% -0.23% -0.25% -0.16%
Consumption -0.02% -0.02% -0.03% -0.09% -0.17% -0.20% -0.22% -0.07%
Investment -0.19% -0.31% -0.56% -0.81% -0.87% -0.76% -0.67% -0.29%
Energy use 0.00% 0.05% 0.24% -0.03% -0.86% -0.65% -0.10% -0.12%
Electricity 0.00% 0.13% 0.55% -2.69% -5.10% -5.03% -4.08% -0.11%
Fossil energy -0.01% 0.02% 0.12% 1.05% 0.90% 1.17% 1.49% -0.12%
Real wage -0.02% -0.04% -0.07% -0.12% -0.14% -0.16% -0.15% -0.08%
Real capital rate -0.02% -0.03% -0.07% -0.12% -0.14% -0.16% -0.15% -0.08%
We start interpretation of results for scenarios SOA and MOP, which do not impose CO2-
neutrality. GDP - as a key indicator of economic performance drops to 0.57 % under SOA (0.08 % for
MOP) during the transition period and remains 0.27% (0.01% in the case of MOP) below BAU levels
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in the long-run. The premature nuclear phase-out implies a loss of productive resources, i.e. the use of
existing nuclear capacities for electricity generation. Earlier investment in replacement technologies
leads to a rise in electricity prices that increase production costs with negative impacts on electricity
demand and sectoral output during the adjustment period. In the long run, consumption and investment
grow from a slightly smaller level. Clearly, the magnitude of these effects is determined by the
effective reduction of nuclear power generation as compared to BAU. The shorter the permissible
operation time of power plants vis-à-vis BAU is, the higher the induced negative adjustment effects
are.
Table 8 indicates that the economy-wide impacts of MOP are insignificant, whereas SOA induces
non-negligible adjustment costs. Only a share of the cost differences is attributable to the difference in
calendar year reduction. The main reason for the substantially higher adjustment costs under SOA as
compared to MOP is the administered use of rather expensive CHP until 2045 to back up nuclear
capacities, whereas under MOP, rather cheap combined cycle-gas turbines (CCGT) can be used. The
implied cost-differences are reflected in the magnitude of electricity price increases and the associated
declines in electricity demand (see Figure 2 and 3). Under SOA, the transitional increase in electricity
price is much higher than under MOP, causing a larger decline in electricity demand. Fossil fuel use in
both scenarios rises as compared to BAU because nuclear power is replaced by gas powered CCGT or
CHP. The increase in fuel demand under SOA is lower than under MOP because of lower overall
electricity demand. In the long run, the structure of power production under SOA and MOP nearly
coincides with BAU because the runtime restrictions for nuclear power plants become obsolete and the
same power plant replacement options become available.
Figure 2: Electricity price index in SOA and MOP (in % change versus BAU)
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Figure 3: Electricity consumption in SOA and MOP (in % change versus BAU)
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Comparison of Tables 9 and 10 with Tables 7 and 8 reveals that the imposition of carbon taxes to
assure CO2-neutrality magnifies the costs of a premature nuclear phase-out. On the adjustment path,
GDP losses range up to 0.73 % under SOA-N (0.27 % for MOP-N) and fall 0.38 % (0.12% in the case
of MOP-N) short of the long-run BAU values. The reason for this is that carbon taxes, which are levied
up to CHF 45 per ton of CO2 during the transition period, decrease factor productivity and, hence, real
income. The revenue-neutral cuts of payroll taxes cannot fully offset the downward pressure of carbon
taxes on the real wage such that the drop in real wages is more pronounced than for scenarios SOA and
MOP without carbon neutrality. Decreased capital productivity joined with higher costs of producing
the investment goods leads to a further drop in the rate of return, which implies lower levels of
investment and reduced capital stocks. The long-term decrease in real consumption can be traced back
to the decline in real income.
In all four scenarios, employment losses are negligible. Significant repercussions on labor
demand which could have been triggered by carbon taxes are to a larger extent offset by revenue-
neutral cuts in labor costs. Negative impacts on labor demand, due to the decline in production, are
compensated by factor substitution effects as labor becomes relatively cheaper compared to capital
inputs.
Welfare
The welfare implications of the phase-out scenarios can be measured in terms of Hicksian
equivalent variation in lifetime income (HEV). For example, a HEV of minus 1 % indicates a loss in
lifetime income of 1% as compared to the BAU. For the sake of transparency, we have converted the
HEV for the four policy counterfactuals into equivalent annual costs per average Swiss household over
the transition period between 2000-2045 (see Table 11). This number indicates how many CHF per
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year the household foregoes due to the respective phase-out scenario. It can be interpreted as the
required average willingness-to-pay of a Swiss citizen to see the respective proposals in place.
Table 11: Welfare implications (projected on the period 2000 - 2045)
CHF per year (CHF/a) and average Swiss household
SOA -200
SOA-N -230
MOP -60
MOP-N -110
SOA imposes costs of 200 CHF/a, whereas costs under MOP only amount to 60 CHF/a. Under
carbon neutrality, the cost for both cases increase due to the distortionary effects of the additional
carbon taxes.
Sectoral Output
Figure 4: Impact of SOA on production in electricity-intensive sectors (in % change versus BAU)
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The long-term impacts of a premature nuclear phase-out on sectoral production are negligible; in
all four scenarios the long-term deviations from BAU levels are less than 0.5%. An accelerated phase-
out induces some structural change during the transition period but in the long run SOA and MOP are
no longer constrained vis-à-vis BAU which explains the very similar long-term structure. Only under
SOA and SOA-N with their substantial increase in electricity prices, do electricity-intensive sectors
such as textiles or paper face a significant decline in output due to the increase of production cost
during the transition period. Figure 4 illustrates the impacts of SOA on production in selected
electricity-intensive sectors (under SOA-N the effects are only slightly higher, since increased energy
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costs in these sectors are more or less offset by cutbacks in labor costs). In line with the electricity
price changes, the production in textile and wood drops by more than 4% in 2015 but recovers during
the adjustment process to catch up with BAU levels in the long run.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated the economic implications of a premature nuclear phase-out in
Switzerland. Our simulations have been based on two concrete policy proposals – SOA and MOP –
which will decided upon by the Swiss voters in 2002. The quantitative results show that SOA,
particularly, imposes non-negligible adjustment costs to the Swiss economy. The reason is that SOA –
as compared to MOP –is not only more restrictive with respect to the permissible operation time of
existing nuclear power plants; it also administers the use of non-competitive CHP during the transition
phase to back up nuclear capacities. Costs of accelerating the phase-out of nuclear power for an
average household amount to 200 CHF/a over the next 45 years under SOA and drop to 60 CHF/a in
the case of MOP.
Under climate policy considerations, both phase-out scenarios induce substantially higher carbon
emissions during the adjustment path, since larger BAU supplies of carbon-free nuclear power must be
replaced by fossil fuel technologies. If Switzerland were to keep carbon emissions at BAU levels larger
CO2 taxes would have to be levied, which would magnify the costs of a premature phase-out. In the
case of carbon-neutrality, adjustment costs increase to 230 CHF under SOA (i.e. SOA-N) and 110 CHF
under MOP (i.e. MOP-N).
We have not accounted for the external costs of nuclear power in our calculations due to the large
uncertainties in the valuation of nuclear risks. Therefore, the adjustment costs presented in our analysis
can not be interpreted as simple excess costs of energy policy interference, but must be viewed as the
price tag for the risk reduction from nuclear power operation given additional constraints (preferences)
on back-up technologies and carbon neutrality.
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Appendix
Table A1: Overview of production sectors
ID Sector ASWZ*
AGR Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 0
ELE Electricity 111
GAS Gas 112
WAS Water supply 113
NAH Manufacture of food products 21
GET Manufacture of beverages 22
TAB Manufacture of tobacco products 23
TEX Manufacture of textiles 24 wo. 2414
KLE Manufacture of wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur 25
HOL Manufacture of products of wood, cork and furniture 26
SAE Manufacture of wood 261
PAP Manufacture of paper and paper products 27
GRA Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 28
LED Tanning and dressing of leather, and manufacture of luggage 29
CHE Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 31, 2414
OEL Refined petroleum products 314
PLA Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 32
NME Manufacture other non-metallic mineral products, mining and
quarrying
33, 121, 123
MET Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products 34
MFB Manufacture of machinery, equipment and vehicles 35
ETE Manufacture of office, accounting and electrical machinery 36, 37, 38
BAU Construction 41
AUS Installation and interior works 42
GRO Wholesale trade, repairing cars 51-531, 532,
54
DET Retail trade 55, 56
HOT Hotels and restaurants 57
EIS Railroad transport, cable and rack railways 61
TRA Other transport and transport via pipelines 62, 63, 64, 65
TEL Post and telecommunications 66
BAN Financial intermediation except insurance and pension funding 71
VER Insurance and pension funding except compulsory social security 72
IMO Real estate activities (incl. leasing of real estate) 73
CON Renting of equipment and other business activities, repair 74-76, 84, 85,
87
STU Research and development, education, and social work 81, 82, 88
GES Health work 83
HAU Private households, non-profit organizations 86, 89
STA Public administration and defense 91
SOZ Compulsory social security 92
* Allgemeine Systematik der Wirtschaftszweige
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Table A2: Overview of consumption categories
ID Consumption category
KNAH Food
KGET Semi-luxury
KKLW Clothes, Furniture, Cleaning
KWON Rents
KELE Electricity
KHEI Oil and gas
KGES Health care
KAUT Cars
KBEN Fuel
KPTR Public transport
KFRE Education, recreation
KDIV Other goods and services
KFOR Expenditures abroad
Table A3: Overview of key substitution elasticities
Substitution elasticity Description Value
σKLEM Substitution elasticity between material aggregate
and labor-capital-energy composite
0.00
σM Substitution elasticity between material inputs
(including diesel and gasoline)
0.00
σKLE Substitution elasticity between labor and capital-
energy composite
see Table A4
σKE Substitution elasticity between capital and energy
composite
0.20
σE Substitution elasticity between energy inputs 0.25
σEXP Transformation elasticity between domestic supply
and exports
see Table A4
σARM Armington substitution elasticity see Table A4
σLEIS Substitution elasticity between leisure and
consumption composite
1.67
σTHO Substitution elasticity between transport composite,
heating and other consumption goods
0.80
σT Substitution elasticity between KPTR and KBEN 0.20
σH Substitution elasticity between KHEI and KELE 0.60
σO Substitution elasticity between other consumption
goods
1.00
σ Intertemporal substitution elasticity 0.50
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Table A4: Values of sector-specific substitution elasticities
Sector σKLE σEXP σARM
AGR 0.68 2.00 1.50
GAS 0.80 2.00 1.50
WAS 0.80 2.00 1.50
NAH 0.71 2.00 1.50
GET 0.71 2.00 1.50
TAB 0.71 2.00 1.50
TEX 0.90 2.00 2.00
KLE 0.90 2.00 2.00
HOL 0.74 2.00 2.00
SAE 0.74 2.00 2.00
PAP 0.74 2.00 3.50
GRA 0.74 2.00 2.00
LED 0.90 2.00 1.50
CHE 0.96 2.00 1.00
OEL 0.96 2.00 1.50
PLA 0.74 2.00 1.00
NME 0.74 2.00 5.00
MET 0.74 2.00 3.00
MFB 0.74 2.00 1.50
ETE 0.74 2.00 1.50
BAU 0.80 2.00 1.50
AUS 0.80 2.00 1.50
GRO 0.80 1.50 1.50
DET 0.80  .50 1.50
HOT 0.80 1.50 1.50
EIS 0.80 1.50 1.50
TRA 0.80 1.50 1.50
TEL 0.80 1.50 1.50
BAN 0.80 1.50 1.50
VER 0.80 1.50 1.50
IMO 0.80 1.50 1.50
CON 0.80 1.50 1.50
STU 0.80 1.50 1.50
GES 0.80 1.50 1.50
HAU 0.80 1.50 1.50
STA 0.80 1.50 1.50
SOZ 0.80 1.50 1.50
